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Cyberattacks on critical infrastructure: An economic 
perspective1
Piotr Lis2, Jacob Mendel 3
Abstract : The aim of this article is to analyze the economic aspects of cybersecurity of 
critical infrastructure defined as physical or virtual systems and assets that are vital to 
a country’s functioning and whose incapacitation or destruction would have a debili-
tating impact on national, economic, military and public security. The functioning of 
modern states, firms and individuals increasingly relies on digital or cyber technologies 
and this trend has also materialized in various facets of critical infrastructure. Critical 
infrastructure presents a new cybersecurity area of attacks and threats that requires 
the attention of regulators and service providers. Deploying critical infrastructure sys-
tems without suitable cybersecurity might make them vulnerable to intrinsic failures 
or malicious attacks and result in serious negative consequences. In this article a full-
er view of costs and losses associated with cyberattacks that includes both private and 
external (social) costs is proposed. An application of the cost-benefit analysis or the 
Return on Security Investment (ROSI) indicator is presented to evaluate the worthiness 
of cybersecurity efforts and analyze the costs associated with some major cyberattacks 
in recent years. The “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover” (IPDRR) frame-
work of organizing cybersecurity efforts is also proposed as well as an illustration as 
to how the blockchain technology could be utilized to improve security and efficiency 
within a critical infrastructure.
Keywords : critical infrastructure, economics of cybersecurity, blockchain, globalized 
economy, smart grid.
JEL codes : D61, D62, D81, L9, O18.
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Introduction
Continuous functioning of countries, governments, international organiza-
tions, corporations and many public services often depends on undisturbed 
access to a critical infrastructure which in this article is defined as systems and 
assets, whether physical or virtual, that are so vital that their incapacitation or 
destruction would have a debilitating impact on national, economic or opera-
tional security, as well as public health or safety (NIST, 2017). The technologi-
cal progress over recent decades means that more and more cyber solutions are 
being introduced into all aspects of modern life which also leads to an increas-
ing dependence of critical infrastructure on digital systems. Not surprisingly 
new cyber threats emerge and nations and organizations face vulnerabilities on 
new fronts which are likely to be amplified by the connectivity of such systems. 
As Smith (2018) put it, “when everything is being connected, anything can be 
disrupted”. The scale of threats and potential disruptions is further multiplied 
by ongoing globalization which relies on technological progress and connec-
tivity to reduce the significance of distance and create a global interrelated sys-
tem (Kowalski, 2013). It is not only the increasing number of cyberattacks on 
critical infrastructure that is concerning (see US Homeland Security NCCIS, 
2015), but also the fact that some governments are learning to use them against 
other countries by either influencing their domestic political processes or de-
veloping cyberweapons that may be used against critical infrastructure. Thus 
in practice changing the nature of warfare (Smith, 2018). Cyberattacks spon-
sored by nation-states are highly concerning because they are often conducted 
by well-funded and highly capable operators and aimed at disabling or dam-
aging another nation’s critical infrastructure (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2019).
Finding solutions that could improve the security of critical infrastructure 
systems and ensure their undisturbed and continuous functioning is becom-
ing one of the major challenges facing individual firms, nations and the global 
economy as a whole. An obvious area of research is within the strict limits of 
cybersecurity, or the protection of hardware, software and data from cyberat-
tacks in internet-connected systems (Singer & Friedman, 2014). Nonetheless the 
development and implementation of technological solutions requires the allo-
cation of scarce resources as well as a development and introduction of certain 
management processes and organizational culture, meaning that the problem 
is also interesting from the perspective of economics and management. This 
motivates the current article in which the aim is to evaluate some of the eco-
nomic implications of cybersecurity efforts and cyberattacks, explore methods 
to determine an optimal level of investment in cybersecurity of critical infra-
structure and propose potential solutions that could lead to the development 
of sustainable, efficient and resilient systems.
Cybercrime costs the global economy up to $575 billion annually (Sobers, 
2019). The rise of disruptive technologies, such as the Internet of Things (IoT), 
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and more than 50 billion devices connected to the Internet by 2020 means that 
the world is facing an increasing risk of cyberattacks. Estimates show that cy-
bercrime extracts up to 20% of the value created by the Internet meaning that 
as much as $3 trillion of global economic value could be at risk by 2020 (Bank 
of America Merrill Lynch, 2015). A recent survey revealed that 90% of organ-
izations that rely on operational technology, including critical infrastructure 
providers, experienced a cyberattack, and half of those organizations suffered 
downtime as a result of cyberattacks in 2017-2018 (Ponemon Institute LLC, 
2019). Going into more detail, 37% of the surveyed organizations reported that 
malware caused significant disruptions to their operations, 33% admitted ex-
periencing “significant” downtime as a result of a cyberattack and, even more 
worrying, 23% claimed they had been hit by attacks orchestrated by nation 
states (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2019). A high profile example4 of a widespread 
cyberattack that also affected critical infrastructure is the WannaCry malware 
attack in May 2017. Within a matter of days it disabled over 250,000 comput-
ers in over 150 countries. In the UK the National Health Service (NHS) can-
celled more than 19,000 patient appointments as a result, many of them criti-
cal operations. Shortly after the NotPetya attack affected a third of computers 
in Ukraine and eventually impaired international shipping and air delivery 
operations (Smith, 2018). Both of these attacks involved nation-states using 
cyberweapons to attack computers on which people rely for their daily lives 
and which exemplified the above argument of the changing nature of warfare.
It is likely that the scale and cost of cybercrime will continue to rise as more 
activities and business functions are moved online and to cloud services thus 
underlining the importance of research into cybersecurity. When it comes to 
the critical infrastructure domain the issue is further complicated by the fact 
that many such systems are 10, 20 or more years old and their design was com-
pleted before cyber threats emerged, which means that they lack the visibility 
and cybersecurity policy enforcement layers typical of the more modern IT 
networks (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2019). In addition significant technologi-
cal upgrades are difficult to implement as the requirement for the continuous 
availability of critical infrastructure systems means that operators cannot af-
ford the downtime necessary for some major upgrades and even if downtime 
is not required, upgrades may be associated with higher unforeseen risks of 
failures which cannot be mitigated. An electric smart grid, which is an integra-
tion of a traditional electrical power network with modern information and 
communication technology, is a case in point. The objective of the smart grid 
is to yield an electric grid system that is available at all times, capable of self-
-healing, self-managing, self-organizing and self-optimizing. Smart grids are 
becoming an important factor in modern economies, requiring special cyber-
security actions to detect, protect and recover the network from cyberattacks 
 4 More examples of cyberattacks are discussed in Section 3.
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and avoid or mitigate power outages, power quality problems and service dis-
ruptions including operations during a cyberattack.
Ponemon Institute LLC (2019) indicates that although 60% of organizations 
in the operational technology sector include disruptive cyberattacks among the 
threats which worry them most, only 48% attempt to quantify the damage a cy-
berattack could have on their organization and even then the estimates are not 
likely to reflect the full picture as they tend to consider only the direct impact 
based on the downtime of attacked systems. One of the reasons why organiza-
tions struggle to quantify the economic impact of cyberattacks and cybersecu-
rity efforts is likely to be the lack of clarity in which costs and benefits should 
be considered as well as the lack of tools and frameworks that could be read-
ily applied to such analysis. Thus this article discusses the types of costs that 
should be taken into account when deciding the level of cybersecurity efforts. 
It is argued that operators of critical infrastructure should not only consider 
the organization’s private costs and benefits associated with cybersecurity ef-
forts or flowing from cyberattacks, but should also be mindful of the external 
costs and benefits and how their decisions may affect other entities and indi-
viduals within the economy. In order for this to happen governments should 
design appropriate regulatory frameworks and incentive structures that aim 
at optimizing social welfare.
The discussion of the benefits and costs of cybersecurity and cyberattacks 
leads to the proposal of a cost-benefit analysis approach to determining the op-
timal level of investment in cybersecurity. In particular the Return on Security 
Investment (ROSI) measure is presented and it is demonstrated how it could 
be applied to evaluating the cybersecurity decisions. In simple terms ROSI is 
defined as the gain from security investment (the amount of risk reduced), less 
the amount spent on cybersecurity and then divided by that amount spent. 
Historical data is also reviewed in order to estimate the losses suffered by or-
ganizations from cyberattacks in recent years. This exercise is important for 
establishing the costs and consequences of cyberattacks and the first step to-
wards obtaining results that could be generalized for a wider population of or-
ganizations and events. Nonetheless such attempts are severely limited by data 
availability as not many firms and organizations are willing to reveal that they 
were attacked or share information on the extent of the damage. Such reports 
reach the public domain typically when attacks are relatively large and organi-
zations are unable to keep them secret. Furthermore national security may re-
quire a layer of secrecy around cybersecurity and cyberattacks in the case of 
critical infrastructure.
Finally two solutions are proposed that could improve the efficiency and ef-
fectiveness of cybersecurity efforts. First, a holistic risk and security manage-
ment framework, “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond, Recover” (IPDRR) is dis-
cussed, which guides cybersecurity activities and considers them as a part of 
the organization’s risk management process. Its aim is to help organizations to 
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align their cybersecurity efforts with business requirements, risk tolerances and 
resources. In addition IPDRR enables organizations, regardless of size, degree 
of cybersecurity risk or sophistication, to apply the principles and best practic-
es of risk management and improve the security and resilience of their critical 
infrastructure. The second proposed solution is the integration of blockchain 
technology into critical infrastructure to provide a secure and stable platform 
able to continuously and reliably support relevant economic and social activi-
ties. Based on the example of an electric smart grid it is argued argue that this 
technology has the potential to provide a high level of protection for critical 
infrastructure systems with added benefits of increased economic efficiency. 
The efficiency gains can be achieved through a development of a fully decen-
tralized energy system in which energy supply contracts are made directly be-
tween energy producers (including small-scale owners of domestic solar pan-
els or wind turbines) and consumers. In such an environment the blockchain 
technology could be a basis for metering, billing, clearing processes, docu-
mentation of ownership, asset management, guarantee of origin and renew-
able energy certificates.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section 1 focuses on the 
costs and benefits of cybersecurity and difficulties in reliably capturing them. 
Section 2 considers tools that can be used to evaluate the worthiness of cyber-
security investments. Section 3 reviews and analyzes consequences of selected 
cyberattacks. Sections 4 and 5 look at potential solutions that could improve 
the cybersecurity and reliability of critical infrastructure. Finally, the last sec-
tion summarizes these arguments and concludes.
1. Difficulties in estimating costs and benefits of cybersecurity
A comprehensive approach to the economic aspects of cybersecurity must in-
clude a thorough consideration of direct and indirect costs of cybersecurity 
measures and the expected damage caused by cyberattacks. The direct costs 
are those incurred directly by owners or providers of critical infrastructure, 
including repairs to damaged networks and elements. They also include losses 
suffered by infrastructure users whose operations are immediately affected by 
cyberattacks. Thus a calculation of direct costs should include losses of equip-
ment, time, production, services, command and control and confidential in-
formation suffered by both critical infrastructure operators and its users (Fung, 
Roumani & Wong, 2013). In extreme cases, for example attacks on the smart 
grid, disruptions may result in losses of human health and life.
The indirect costs are linked to the economic concept of negative externali-
ties and refer mostly to costs and damages incurred by third parties who are 
not direct victims of a cyberattack and are not responsible for the maintenance 
of critical infrastructure elements, but may be their users. For example, follow-
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Table 1. The direct and indirect costs of cyber security attacks
Direct costs Indirect costs
operational disruption, replacement or up-
grading of damaged goods and equipment 
(or infrastructure) including spare parts
a decline in future revenues
a business continuity plan insurance
cyber security service level agreements market failures due to cyber-attacks may also 
impact cyber security regulations which have 
a consequent economic effect on the market
physical security including: security infor-
mation and event management (siem), ac-
cess control procedures and computer room 
controls
government activities associated with the 
cyber-attack
business income disruptions lost productivity
insurance charges privacy violations and future privacy protec-
tion
recruitment (because of special talent re-
quirements potential candidates may not 
wish to work in a firm which has suffered a 
cyber-attack)
the recovery process
intellectual property (IP) losses increased cyber security investment (such as 
installing additional cyber security technolo-
gies and procedures/policies, hiring cyber 
security experts and adding external audits)
recovery process reduced foreign investment in the country 
or region which had the cyber-attack; the 
cyber-attack may cause investors to move 
out of the high-risk domain and territories
risk assessment the economic impact of investors that may 
look for countries whose governments are 
pro-actively investing in cyber security
damage to trade name stock market losses
lost customer relationships and contracts
loss of human life and health
lost revenue from disruption to an organiza-
tion’s internet sites/webpages
it staff and external contractors working to 
bring organization systems back to full func-
tionality (including on-line systems)
legal complaints including privacy violation 
issues
security product license fees
Source: (Mendel, 2018).
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ing an attack on the electric smart grid indirect costs could be associated with 
disruptions to supply chains and economic activity as well as ensuing losses 
of tax revenue. A response to heightened cybersecurity threats may lead to in-
creased costs of doing business brought about by enhancement of government 
policies and higher electricity prices for end users due to increased security 
and insurance costs faced by utilities. Table 1 provides a summary of the direct 
and indirect costs of cyber-attacks.
The not negligible costs of cybersecurity and scarcity of resources available 
to an organization, as well as across a wider economy, mean that the devel-
opment of a cybersecurity strategy and implementation of respective efforts 
should be based on a sound analysis which takes into account risks, expect-
ed costs and expected benefits of such efforts. The chief benefit is that secure 
critical infrastructure is reliable in providing support for the successful and 
continuous functioning of a modern society, enabling economic and social 
development. As already noted this reliability tends to be achieved by an in-
tegration of advanced Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) 
in order to design systems which, in addition to being secure, are flexible, ef-
ficient and sustainable. Another benefit of introducing ICT, for example in an 
electric smart grid, is that it enables stakeholders to monitor the performance 
of even the smallest infrastructure elements in real time, thus providing op-
portunities for efficiency gains by spotting threats and failures early or identi-
fying and managing periods and areas of increased usage.
However as the scale and complexity of ICT-dependent critical infrastruc-
tures increase new threats arise from malicious intruders who could exploit 
unforeseen loopholes and unexpected system weaknesses to mount cyberat-
tacks leading to potentially devastating effects. For example, one could imagine 
dire consequences of shutting down a smart grid and ensuing power shortages 
affecting work of hospitals, road, rail and air traffic control, communication 
within other infrastructure networks and disruptions to industrial production 
processes, among others5. Conversely highly secured critical infrastructure 
could improve efficiency and reduce costs to all stakeholders, including sup-
pliers and customers (Fung et al., 2013).
Due to the high degree of asymmetric information and uncertainty in the 
area of cybersecurity any analysis of costs and benefits associated with cyber-
security and cyberattacks may rely only on approximations and estimations. 
The dynamic nature of the race between “protectors” and hackers as well as 
a virtual impossibility to foresee and measure all consequences of cyberattacks 
 5 The power outage that occurred in Ukraine in 2015 was the first known power outage 
caused by a cyberattack. Three energy companies were affected be the event, around 30 substa-
tions were switched off and some 225,000 people were without power for one to three hours. 
The attack was believed to be conducted by “Sandworm”, a Russian advanced persistent threat 
group and occurred during the ongoing conflict between Ukraine and Russia over Crimea (Vijay, 
Hoikka & Kenneth, 2015).
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mean that analysts may base their considerations on expected costs and ex-
pected benefits. This presents a serious hindrance because, for example, how 
does one estimate the economic loss from reduced trust and confidence in 
the Internet economy due to a series of cyberattacks? Currently there are no 
ready answers to such questions or agreed practices. Nonetheless this pre-
sents a promising field for future research where economic theory and ana-
lytical tools are useful.
The development of a holistic economic framework for capturing costs, ben-
efits and consequences of cyberattacks and cybersecurity is also a potentially 
fruitful starting point for future policymaking. That is because it will enhance 
the focus on market participants’ incentive structures and market externalities. 
The wealth of opportunities presented by disruptive technologies such as ar-
tificial intelligence (AI) cannot be fulfilled without progression in other areas 
of knowledge, including economics and management. This is likely to be ob-
served also in the area of critical infrastructure where governments and busi-
nesses are making major investments in new cybersecurity technologies and 
boosting resilience of the critical systems. Some of those solutions will prove 
insightful, even create new jobs and markets, whereas others will present loss in 
terms of costs (Evans, 2017). A reliable and comprehensive approach is needed 
to evaluate such investments and ensure that available resources are dedicated 
to solutions and activities that promise the greatest efficiency gains. The fol-
lowing section makes a step in that direction and discusses a tool that can be 
used to evaluate the return on security investment.
2. Evaluating the costs and benefits of cybersecurity efforts
Faced with hackers attempting to exploit vulnerabilities in their systems and 
potentially the considerable ensuing costs of cyberattacks, organizations must 
decide how much of their scarce resources to devote to cybersecurity. Thus 
they face a decision-making problem which can be solved using economic 
frameworks and analytical tools. The approach to the economics of cyber se-
curity proposed in the current article is rooted in the rational choice model 
which is well known to all students of economics.6 This model can be used 
to analyze the behaviour of a wide spectrum of economic agents, including 
critical infrastructure providers, users, governments and regulators as well 
as hackers and organized crime agents. The economic analysis offers tools 
enabling the identification and evaluation of expected trade-offs, market 
failures, efficiencies, welfare effects, including those of information sharing 
 6 This cyber security investment problem can be also looked at from the game theory per-
spective, an approach taken by Gintis (2005), Su (2006), Beasley, Venayagamoorthy and Brooks 
(2014) and Jentzsch (2016), among others.
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among agents and the economic impact of insurance markets and regulation 
within cybersecurity.
2.1. An operator-centric approach
In the remainder of this article e a firm-centric, or operator-centric, approach 
is taken and with consideration of the expected costs and expected benefits that 
critical infrastructure providers derive from their investment in cybersecurity 
solutions. Those considerations relate not only to the question of how many 
resources should an operator dedicate to cybersecurity, but also which techno-
logical solutions should be chosen to maximize efficiency gains. Intrinsically 
private firms are likely to take a narrow approach to welfare gains and consider 
only private costs and benefits of their actions. Not accounting for externalities 
discussed in the previous section may lead to market failures where non-trivial 
social costs and benefits of cybersecurity provision are ignored.
The development of a comprehensive toolbox for assessing the effects and 
implications of various forms of cybersecurity investments requires a thorough 
understanding of many aspects of cybersecurity, including agents’ behaviour 
and the extent of damages caused by attacks. Unfortunately the existing studies 
of economics of cyber security suffer from a number of limitations (see OECD, 
2009a, for a more comprehensive review). First, they provide limited insights 
into how actors actually perceive expected costs and expected benefits and the 
incentives which they face. The difficulty of estimating tangible benefits leads to 
a problem of making a business case for spending on cybersecurity (Jentzsch, 
2016). Second, existing literature struggles to consider dynamic and learning 
effects, such as how a loss of reputation changes the incentives. Third, they of-
ten treat issues of institutional design as rather trivial. Fourth, the existence of 
potential positive and negative externalities from cyber security efforts is too 
often neglected.
Nonetheless economic literature on the subject has been growing in recent 
years and shedding light on some important aspects of cyber security, includ-
ing the drivers of organizations’ investment in cyber security. According to 
various authors when determining the amounts of resources spent on cyber 
security and protection against cyber-attacks firms mainly focus on the aims of 
protecting customer data and privacy (Louis, Adrian & Evangelos, 2016), the 
protection of intellectual property, trade secrets or other business assets (Klahr 
et al., 2017), ensuring business continuity and preventing downtime (Bernik 
& Prislan, 2016), compliance with laws and regulations (Wakefield, 2012) and 
protecting the organization’s reputation (Lloyd’s, 2015).
Irrespective of their security priorities, firms, which are assumed to be ra-
tional and profit-maximizing agents, require tools to assess the efficiency of 
their efforts and whether their scarce resources bring the best possible return. 
In the following section one such tool is presented.
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2.2. Return on Security Investment (ROSI)
There are several models for the calculation of the Return on Security Investment 
(ROSI), which are also called security metrics or cyber threat metrics. As a start-
ing point, the Return on Investment (ROI) is defined as follows:
       
   
Gain from investment    Cost of investmentROI
Cost of investment
−
= .
Senior management of any organization wants to know the impact that cy-
bersecurity has on the organization’s net income. In order to determine how 
much should be invested or spent they need to know the expected costs of not 
implementing certain cybersecurity measures, the costs and benefits if imple-
mented and what are the most cost-effective solutions. The classical financial 
approach based on the ROI calculations is not particularly appropriate for an-
swering those questions. Cybersecurity investment does not generally result 
in profit as it focuses mainly on loss prevention or reducing the risks. In such 
cases the Return on Security Investment (ROSI) allows the calculation as to 
how much loss is avoided thanks to the investment (ENISA, 2012). The ROSI 
measure provides quantitative answers to essential economic questions: Is an 
organization investing too much or too little in cyber security? What is the eco-
nomic impact on an organization if there is no investment in cyber security? 
When is the cyber security investment enough?
To obtain the ROSI indicator the single loss expectancy (SLE) has to be de-
fined as the expected amount of money that is lost when a risk occurs. In other 
words SLE is the total cost of an incident with a single occurrence. Due to the 
specific nature of cybersecurity incidents the major complexity is to consider 
all the asset on which s an incident has a direct or indirect impact. For exam-
ple, a stolen laptop will not only result in the cost of its replacement but may 
also infer productivity loss, reputation loss, IT support time as well as loss of 
data and intellectual property. The total cost of an incident should include the 
cost of direct losses (e.g. website downtime, hardware replacement, data loss 
replacement, temporary loss of data, corruption of the system or software, per-
manent change of data, lost access to a third-party system, money or intellectual 
property stolen) as well as the cost of indirect losses (investigation time, loss 
of reputation and image, etc.). The ROSI calculation relies on many approxi-
mations as the cost of cybersecurity incidents and annual rate of occurrence 
are hard to estimate and the resulting numbers can vary significantly from one 
environment to another. These approximations are often subjective and biased 
by personal perception of the risk, meaning that the ROSI calculation can be 
easily manipulated. The accuracy of statistical data used in the ROSI calcula-
tion is therefore essential. However organizations tend to be reluctant to pro-
vide data on security incidents (ENISA, 2012) which means that there is an 
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absence of actuarial tables from which information on damages based upon 
real cases can be derived (Jentzsch, 2016). The lack of data makes it difficult to 
evaluate and justify cybersecurity investments which are often seen as costs.
Another relevant measure is the annual rate of occurrence (ARO) which is 
the probability that a risk occurs within a year. Combining SLE and ARO the 
annual loss expectancy (ALE) is obtained which is the annual monetary loss 
that can be expected from a specific risk on a specific asset. It is calculated as 
follows (ENISA, 2012):
ALE = ARO ∙ SLE.
An alternative, but nonetheless similar, approach to the calculation of ALE 
has been proposed by Su (2006):
1
( )
n
i
i
ALE I Oi F
=
=∑ ,
where Oi represents a harmful outcome i, I(Oi) is the impact of that outcome 
in monetary units and Fi is the frequency of occurrence of outcome i.
The calculation of ROSI combines the quantitative risk assessment and the 
cost of implementing security countermeasures against this risk. As such ROSI 
can be defined as:
         
     
Monetary loss reductionROSI
Cost of the solution
Cost of the solution−
= .
In practice ROSI compares ALE with the expected loss saving and is based 
on three variables: ALE estimated risk mitigation and cost of the solution be-
ing implemented. The latter is relatively easy to determine (provided all indi-
rect costs are considered), while the two other variables can at best be based 
on estimations. Implementing an effective security solution lowers ALE; the 
more effective that solution is, the more ALE is reduced. The monetary loss 
reduction can be defined as the difference between ALE without the security 
solution being implemented and ALE with the relevant implementation, i.e. 
ALEno security – ALEwith security (Bojanc & Jerman-Blažič, 2008):
   ( )      
     
no security with securityALE ALEROSI
Cost of the solution
Cost of the solution− −
= .
The same result can be obtained by multiplying ALE by the risk mitigation 
ratio of the solution applied to obtain the value of the monetary loss reduction. 
In this case the ROSI formula can be written as (ENISA, 2012):
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⋅ −       
     
ALE Mitigation ratio    Cost of the solution
ROSI
Cost of the solution
= .
Let us consider the following hypothetical example. A power utility firm is 
considering investing in an Intrusion Detection System (IDS). Each year the 
firm suffers 18 cyber-attacks (ARO = 18). The economic cost estimates of each 
attack are approximately $3,940 in loss of productivity (SLE = 3940). The IDS 
solution is expected to block 85% of the attacks (mitigation ratio = 85%) and 
costs $17,000 per year (due to license fees, trainings, installation, maintenance 
etc.). ROSI for this solution can then be calculated as follows:
= = 155%
17,000
ROSI (18 ⋅ 3,940) ⋅ 0.85 − 17,000 .
Thus, according to this measure, the IDS solution is cost-effective because the 
investment is expected to generate value greater than its cost (ROSI > 100%). 
The higher the value of ROSI, the more worthwhile the security investment.
As previously highlighted the limits of ROSI lie in the difficulty of reliably 
estimating costs of cyberattacks and their annual rate of occurrence. The re-
sulting numbers can vary highly from one environment to another. These ap-
proximations are often biased by the evaluator’s perception of the risk. ROSI 
does not readily uncover the quantified cost-benefit of individual security 
countermeasures. The ALE element is also flawed in that it assumes that all 
security breaches carry the same cost implications. If the expected annual cost 
of security failures is, e.g. $10 million and the security system is thought to be 
85% effective, it does not necessarily follow that the security system will save 
$8.5 million. If a particularly expensive type of breach falls into the 15% of in-
cidents against which the security solution is ineffective, then the ALE estimate 
will be overly optimistic (Lockstep Consulting, 2004).
The following section attempts to estimate losses suffered by various organ-
izations from cyberattacks in recent years and establish the consequences of 
such attacks. Given the abovementioned lack of relevant actuarial tables this 
exercise is the first step towards obtaining results that could be generalized for 
a wider population of organizations and events and thus used in the evalua-
tion of monetary losses required to calculate ROSI.
3. The cost and impact of selected cyberattacks
The impact of security incidents can be significant for the organizations affected 
(Rebecca & Rob, 2019). Although in some cases the direct financial costs of the 
breach may be covered by cyber insurance policies the damage to the reputa-
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tion, relationships within the industry and the impact on users and employees 
may be long lasting, hard to measure and difficult to repair. As mentioned be-
fore economic analysis should consider all expected costs and expected ben-
efits of providing cybersecurity to critical infrastructure and the costs ought 
to include losses and damages from attacks which are not prevented. One of 
the biggest challenges in performing a systematic and robust analysis enabling 
researchers to generalize results is the lack of openly available and reliable in-
formation on cyberattacks as relevant organizations and governments are of-
ten reluctant to reveal information on such attacks (OECD, 2009b; Council of 
Economic Advisers, 2018). This can be motivated by the desire to keep evi-
dence of an occurred incident hidden to protect the reputation of the provid-
er or not to cause unnecessary panic when it concerns critical infrastructure 
networks. The sensitivity of the data is another reason as to why organizations 
may want to avoid further leakages of knowledge about their system’s weak-
nesses. In some cases, for example when it comes to the smart grids, the rea-
son for limited data availability on attacks may be the scarcity of such systems 
(Marotta, Martinelli, Nanni, Orlando & Yautsiukhin, 2017).
Driven by those data limitations this article analyzes historical cybersecurity 
incidents from a range of industries, not necessarily within the critical infra-
structure domain, where more information is available. It is expected that the 
economic impact of those incidents should, to some extent, be a good indica-
tion of the consequences of cyber-attacks on critical infrastructure. According 
to OECD (2015), the digital security threat landscape continues to evolve, 
sustained by often profitable business models such as ransomware. The most 
prominent strain of ransomware is “CryptoLocker” which is spread via email 
attachments. Experts estimate that “CryptoLocker” infected some 234,000 com-
puters, extracting more than $27 million in ransom payments during its first 
two months of operation (OECD, 2015).
The Target, Home Depot, JPMorgan Chase and Sony Pictures Entertainment 
breaches are examples of how destructive malware can be to organization’s 
reputation and financial stability (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2015). Moreover 
the severity and frequency of malware attacks exhibits an upward tendency. In 
a typical week an organization can receive an average of nearly 17,000 malware 
alerts. The time to respond to these alerts is a severe drain on an organization’s 
financial resources and IT security personnel. The average cost of time wasted 
responding to inaccurate and erroneous intelligence can average $1.27 mil-
lion annually. Of those 17,000 alerts only 19% are considered to be reliable and 
merely 4% are investigated (Ponemon Institute LLC, 2015).
According to the findings by FireEye (2013) malware has become a multi-
national activity. For example in 2012 alone, callbacks were sent to Command 
and Control (C&C) servers in 184 countries. Whenever personal data are be-
ing collected, stored or processed, security incidents can heavily affect privacy 
and also generate significant costs to firms as well as to users (OECD, 2013). 
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When combined with the payments arising from pending lawsuits and other 
relevant measures taken to reduce the direct and indirect damages the cost per 
data entry stolen can provide a simplified measurement of the level of risks 
faced by companies storing personal data, standardized by the overall amount 
of data entries stored.
The TJX7 data breach involving around 100 million records forced TJX 
to set aside $118 million to cover costs and potential liabilities in 2008, i.e. 
$1.18 per record. This included $11 million (9% of the total amount) in se-
curity consultancy fees and other attack-related expenses and a contingency 
fund of $107 million to cover liability payments arising from pending law-
suits. The impact of the intrusions was estimated to be a 57% reduction in 
the firm’s net income compared to the earlier year (OECD, 2013). This, how-
ever, did not cover losses in reputation, impact on the brand and other indi-
rect and opportunity costs.
Another example is the data breach at Heartland Payment Systems (HPS)8 
involving around 130 million records in 2009. As a consequence of this 
breach HPS agreed to set up a fund worth $105 million to cover liability pay-
ments ($0.80 per record). Of this amount $41 million (39%) was dedicated 
to MasterCard customers, $60 million (57%) to VISA customers and almost 
$4 million (4%) to American Express customers. How much HPS spent on se-
curity-related investments as well as the indirect costs remains unknown but 
the financial statement for 2009 revealed that the firm had a net loss of more 
than $52 million (compared to a net profit of $42 million a year earlier), even 
though the revenues increased by 7%. Furthermore its stock prices dropped 
from $15.44 on 16 January to $8.54 on 23 January, two days after revealing the 
breach (OECD, 2013).
Another high profile example of a cyberattack is the security breach in Sony’s 
PlayStation Network and Sony Online Entertainment in 2011. It resulted in an 
exposure of some 103 million records and, as a consequence, a 23-day closure of 
the PlayStation Network. According to Sony’s executives this data breach cost the 
company at least $171 million, or $1.7 per record (OECD, 2013). This number 
does not cover liability payments, as in the previous cases, but rather “includes 
expenses of an identity theft prevention program and promotional packages to 
win back customers, among other things” (Goodin, 2011). In other words, it 
covers (parts of) the indirect reputation and opportunity costs. Under the as-
sumption that Sony would also have to set aside a fund worth $1 per record to 
cover liability payments arising from pending lawsuits an additional $103 mil-
 7 The TJX Companies Inc. is an off-price retailer of apparel and home fashions in the U.S. 
and worldwide, ranking number 87 in the 2017 Fortune 500 listings, with over $33 billion in 
revenues in 2016, more than 3,800 stores in nine countries, and three e-commerce sites (source: 
http://www.tjx.com/company/).
 8 Heartland Payment Systems is a Princeton (New Jersey)-based bank card payment pro-
cessor for merchants in the United States (Flick & Morehouse, 2010).
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lion would have had to be provided. This would still not include investments in 
security assessment and enhancing initiatives (e.g. security consultancy fees).
The cost of data breaches is not limited to the firms suffering from the breach 
but also includes the costs consumers have to pay. For example, it is estimated 
that 10% of Americans have had their identities stolen and each of those indi-
viduals lost around $5,000 on average (O’Dell, 2011). Similarly it is estimated 
that also one in ten Australians fell victim of online identity theft, losing an 
average of $790. In the United Kingdom almost two million people have their 
identities stolen every year at a cost of $3.48 billion to the national economy. 
With criminals gaining an average of $1,289 for each name they steal a large 
share of the costs suffered by the victims goes directly to the criminals, whereas 
the rest is made up of the resources dedicated by individuals and companies to 
preventing and detecting the crime and putting right the damage. In serious 
cases it can take more than 200 hours to resolve problems caused by identity 
fraud (OECD, 2013).
So far the discussion has identified a clear knowledge gap, namely, the lack 
of a holistic framework for the implementation and management of cyberse-
curity and analysis of its results and consequences within critical infrastruc-
ture. The following section proposes such a framework for organizing cyber-
security efforts.
4. The “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and Recover” 
framework
A comprehensive framework for enhanced development, implementation and 
management of cybersecurity should result in an increased resilience of criti-
cal infrastructure systems, but also lead to decisions that ensure the most effi-
cient use of resources. Thus the holistic “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and 
Recover” (IPDRR) framework is suggested which focuses on using business 
drivers to guide cybersecurity activities and considers cyber threats as a part 
of the organization’s risk management process. The framework consists of a set 
of activities and outcomes that are common across the critical infrastructure 
sector and provides detailed guidance for developing individual organizational 
profiles. Nonetheless it is not a one-size-fits-all approach to managing cyber-
security for critical infrastructure as organizations face unique risks driven by 
specific threats, vulnerabilities and risk tolerances. Instead the proposed frame-
work should be perceived as a set of guidelines and principles that each organ-
izations can adapt to its unique and specific needs. Thus organizations ought 
to determine activities that are important to critical service delivery and then 
prioritize investments to maximize the impact per dollar spent. The framework 
provides a common taxonomy and mechanism for organizations to: (1) de-
scribe their current cybersecurity position; (2) determine their cybersecurity 
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targets; (3) identify and prioritize opportunities for improvement within the 
context of business continuation; and (4) communicate existing cybersecurity 
risks to internal and external stakeholders.
The IPDRR framework consists of five concurrent and continuous func-
tions shown in Figure 1. When considered together these functions provide 
a strategic view of the lifecycle of an organization’s management of cybersecu-
rity, which can help organizations to structure their risk management, cyber 
threat environment, legal and regulatory requirements, business objectives 
and organizational constraints. Figure 1 presents the aims and outcomes that 
are characteristic for these five functions, along with typical levels of priority 
assigned to each of them for maintaining continuous functioning of critical 
infrastructure which is disrupted as little as possible in case of a cyberattack.
The IPDRR framework organizes the risk management process into a chain 
of ongoing activities of identifying, assessing and responding to risks, depict-
ed in Figure 2. To manage risks, organizations should understand the prob-
ability of an event and the likely extent of its impact. Then they can determine 
their risk tolerance, i.e. the acceptable level of risk for continuous delivery of 
services. Risks may be handled in various ways, including mitigation, transfer, 
avoidance or acceptance, depending on the expected impact on critical services.
Following the “road map” in Figure 2 the IPDRR framework can be used 
to develop an action plan to strengthen existing cybersecurity practices or to 
create new cybersecurity programmes. It can also be used to identify opportu-
nities for new or revised guidelines, procedures or practices, including a com-
mon set of reporting and communication standards that could enhance the 
coordination of efforts across different departments of an organization or with 
its external stakeholders and consequently reduce the threats to the continu-
ous delivery of essential critical infrastructure services.
5. Blockchain and cybersecurity of critical infrastructure
Since blockchain technology is considered to improve cybersecurity and pro-
vide a high level of privacy protection (Kshetri, 2017) its adoption to a criti-
cal infrastructure system could reduce the risk of breaches while being cost 
efficient (Rogers & Henderson, 2019) and speedy. Before discussing how this 
technology could be applied to securing critical infrastructure against cyber 
threats its basic concepts and principles will be briefly explained.
5.1. The basics of blockchain
Blockchain is a type of distributed, electronic database, a ledger, which can 
hold any information (e.g. user data records, critical events information, bank-
ing transactions or device service history) and set rules on how this informa-
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tion can be updated. The blockchain continually grows as blocks of data are 
appended and linked (chained) to the previous block of data using a crypto-
graphic hash function.9 The ledger is validated and maintained by a network 
of participants (nodes) according to a predefined consensus mechanism so no 
single centralized authority is needed. Multiple (but not necessarily all) nodes 
hold a full copy of the entire blockchain database (Sikorski, Haughton & Kraft, 
2017). This means that if an attacker tries to penetrate a blockchain network 
and corrupts one node there are many other redundant and identical copies 
of the ledger stored on different computers that can provide valid information. 
Arguably there is no single point of failure in the blockchain and for hacking 
to be successful more than 50% of nodes need to be hacked simultaneously.
The main difference between blockchain and a traditional database is the 
way in which records evolve over time. The blockchain system allows multiple 
participants to submit new data to the distributed ledger and then consensus10 
is used to determine which state of the data is valid. In a traditional database 
multiple participants can submit new data but only one counterparty is relied 
on to provide the valid state of the database. A drawback of the blockchain 
technology is that it consumes significant amounts of energy although a num-
ber of consensus mechanisms that lower electricity consumption has been de-
veloped in recent years (see Conti, Kumar, Lal & Ruj, 2017).
5.2. Application of blockchain in critical infrastructure
Blockchain technology has the potential to provide robust and strong cyber-
security solutions and a high level of protection for critical infrastructure sys-
tems. It can handle data in such a way that they can only be seen by users with 
specific permissions and proofs of identity are stored in a cryptographic for-
mat. The security is enhanced by maintaining two distinct ledgers: a ledger with 
individually encrypted data; and a transaction ledger which stores encryption 
access keys to the related data. Each access to the data is recorded and stored, 
it can also be timed or restricted to a certain number of attempts or entries. 
This means that third parties, such as other critical infrastructure providers, 
financial institutions or government agencies, may get permission to access 
only specific documents at specific times. Blockchain technology can improve 
the security of critical infrastructure by functioning as a cost-effective tool to 
 9 The hash function is a one-way function, i.e. it is very difficult to reverse an operation 
and derive the original input data. Additionally it is unfeasible for two different data inputs to 
result in the same hash value which means that in order to alter an entry in a past block all sub-
sequent blocks also need to be altered. If one computer’s blockchain updates are breached, the 
blockchain system will reject this computer data.
 10 A consensus protocol is a mechanism through which all users within a blockchain system 
agree on the validity of the data. Importantly all parties must agree to a single “true” version of 
information.
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track and secure the complete history of data transactions. If a security breach 
is discovered, thanks to its multi-node structure, the blockchain technology 
can facilitate data recovery and data integrity.
As an example let us consider a case of a smart grid system with decentral-
ized energy generation, where electricity can be traded directly among network 
users via a blockchain system. In such a setup the blockchain can facilitate the 
making of smart contracts directly between energy producers and consumers 
while enabling the latter to also produce their own electricity and sell it with-
in the smart grid. Thus a party that is predominantly an energy consumer, for 
example a household with rooftop solar panels, can also play the role of a mi-
cro-producer in such a system. The blockchain technology could ensure the 
efficiency of this smart grid by providing a secure basis for metering, billing, 
clearing, documentation of ownership, asset management, guarantee of origin 
and renewable energy certificates, among others. It could create a fully auto-
mated energy market with near real-time settlement, for example, if the cus-
tomer fails to pay, the smart contract would automatically suspend the power 
supply. If all transactions are recorded on regulated ledgers it might be possible 
to implement prudential regulations or automatically restrict new transactions 
to solely green energy sources.
There are several drivers behind the adoption of distributed ledger tech-
nology in critical infrastructure systems, including the smart grid. The first of 
them is the pursuit of cost reductions by taking advantage of the opportunity to 
unplug legacy systems and reduce the number of layers required for data shar-
ing. By ensuring that data is natively in digital format and shared at the point 
of transaction the transaction time will be shortened. The second one is risk-
management. By providing a standardized framework for transaction record-
ing critical infrastructure providers can make risk management much simpler 
and respond to changes in near real time. Regulatory compliance is the third 
driver where the technology can ensure that only authorized transactions are 
conducted in line with the rule of law.
Using blockchain technology in critical infrastructure systems could bring 
benefits beyond the security considerations. For example, in the case of the 
electric smart grid, it could result in a cost reduction to customers’ energy bills 
due to reduced profit margins between suppliers and customers, lower oper-
ating costs for meter reading and billing and no or reduced certification costs 
for renewable electricity. An additional benefit of using the blockchain tech-
nology is a greater transparency for consumers who could readily track where 
the electricity they purchase was produced or what percentage share of energy 
supplied is from renewable sources.
Furthermore reduced barriers to entry, transaction costs and simpler bill-
ing processes could enable new energy providers to enter the energy markets 
and break predominant monopolies. The possibility of selling energy by con-
sumers who operate their own renewable energy sources, such as rooftop solar 
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systems or small-scale wind turbines, would improve the economic viability 
of such solutions, provide a growth impulse for the green energy sector, im-
prove market resilience and competition as well as having a positive effect on 
the natural environment.
In order to ensure privacy protection in critical infrastructure systems em-
ploying blockchain-based solutions the system should be designed in a way 
that keeps the private information visible only to authorized entities and blocks 
unauthorized access to transactions. In addition, the blockchain system should 
use multiple digital signatures for authorizing and encryption of the transac-
tions so only the counterparties involved are able to access the whole informa-
tion (the ledger can be encrypted with more than one key). Government reg-
ulation is likely to be one of the most significant factors determining whether 
blockchain technology will flourish within critical infrastructure systems. In 
many areas, including the smart grid, blockchain technology is still in its in-
fancy, which means that it comes with a range of uncertainties, risks and prob-
lems that remain to be solved.
Conclusions
The fast pace of technological progress over recent decades has meant that the 
functioning of modern states, firms and individuals increasingly relies on digital 
or cyber technologies and this trend has also materialized in various facets of 
critical infrastructure. Nowadays critical infrastructure presents new cyberse-
curity area of attacks and threats that requires the attention of regulators, gov-
ernments as well as service providers. Deploying critical infrastructure systems 
without suitable cybersecurity might make them vulnerable to intrinsic failures 
or malicious attacks, and result in serious negative consequences for a nation 
or firm due to, for example, instability of crucial utilities, energy fraud, loss of 
user information or other critical data. This means that cybersecurity efforts 
should focus on ensuring availability, reliability, efficiency and self-healing of 
critical infrastructure systems.
To date there is no agreed and uniform approach to estimating economic 
damage from cyberattacks against critical infrastructure or benefits of adequate 
cybersecurity provision. The picture is complicated by the high degree of un-
certainty and asymmetric information inherent to security problems and risk 
management, as well as the difficulty in capturing relevant external costs and 
benefits of cybersecurity activities or their lack. Furthermore each sector has 
a different loss model requiring a special dedicated analysis, thus, one-fits-all 
solutions are not feasible. The danger is that if a specific problem is not assigned 
an accurate monetary value it may not receive an economically optimal amount 
of attention and resources, leading to losses in economic efficiency and wel-
fare. This paper argues that critical infrastructure providers, and governments 
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should ensure that a holistic cost-benefit analysis of cybersecurity efforts, tak-
ing into account internal and external costs, should be an integral part of their 
decision making. This could be aided by tools such as ROSI. Nonetheless any 
indicator can be only as reliable as the information fed into it. Currently the lack 
of representative data on cyberattacks means that there are no actuarial tables 
from which information on damages and their probabilities could be derived. 
Additionally the data scarcity prevents analysts from estimating the extent of 
external costs and benefits associated with cybersecurity and cyberattacks thus 
making it difficult to design functioning mechanisms for internalizing exter-
nalities. Once these two elements are determined the proposed measure of re-
turns on security investment could be augmented to give a more reliable tool 
in deciding which cybersecurity solutions are optimal.
Critical infrastructure providers often do not have sufficient incentive to 
scale up their cybersecurity to reflect its external impacts beyond the organi-
zation. This creates a significant space for government intervention, regulatory 
frameworks and legal requirements for implementing and maintaining certain 
cybersecurity standards. The holistic “Identify, Protect, Detect, Respond and 
Recover” (IPDRR) framework of organizing cybersecurity efforts within an 
organization as well as an illustration of how blockchain technology could be 
utilized to improve the security of critical infrastructure are proposed. These 
proposals could be used as guidance for both critical infrastructure providers 
in their daily operations as well as authorities in the development of appropri-
ate regulatory frameworks. In order to ensure security of their nations govern-
ments must work closely with technology firms, including critical infrastruc-
ture operators, who are likely to act as first responders to security challenges. 
Recent years have shown that cyber technology has become a new battlefield 
and, since cyber space is often owned by private technology firms, maintain-
ing security and peace requires that governments, private firms and organiza-
tions work together.
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